Malawi officially tops fuel pump price in Africa

Hong Kong has the highest fuel prices in the world, with prices reaching over $3.00 per litre in 2025 due to high taxes and import costs, and a lack of local refining facilities. Other locations that frequently appear among the most expensive are in Europe, like Iceland at $2.48 per litre. In Africa, the Central African Republic has consistently recorded the highest fuel prices in Africa with prices around $1.858 per litre as of August 2025. Other countries with exceptionally high fuel costs include Senegal at $1.55 per litre, Zimbabwe at $1.48 per litre, and Ivory Coast at $1.39 per litre.

As of October 1, 2025, Malawi could be the highest in terms of fuel pump price in Africa, at about $2 per litre.

Current fuel prices in Malawi

Diesel: MWK 3,500 per litre ($2.00 USD).

Petrol: MWK 3,499 per litre ($2.00 USD).

The Malawi Energy Regulatory Authority (MERA) announced this increase effective October 1, 2025, representing a 33.2% jump. 

Background on the price change

The price hikes are a result of increasing global oil prices and the fixation of the official rate of exchange of the Malawian kwacha against the US dollar that is used to compare the prices. 

Prior to this increase, the last reported prices were as follows, from September 22, 2025: 

Diesel: MWK 2,734 per litre ($1.57 USD).

Petrol: MWK 2,530 per litre ($1.46 USD).

Some local commentators on the local market economy are hopeful that this will be a temporary situation, expecting authorities will devalue the local currency to bring down the dollar price per litre for the fuel pump prices. On the other hand, if the situation remains unchanged beyond the short term, it will scare foreign capital as it will be very costly to do business in Malawi. One would not expect to make a decent return on their investment, in a situation where they spend $2 per litre of fuel.

Poisonous Food Plants: Ways to Detoxify Them

 Many plants in adapting to environmental attacks develop poisonous features in an attempt to protect themselves from predators. I hereby present three of them. Feel free to add other plants that you know in the comments below.

1. Cassava (Cyanide poisoning)

Drought limit plant range that aphids can feed on, and the drought-tolerant cassava becomes their target food. In order to protect itself from aphids and the attendant cassava mosaic virus, the cassava plants develop cyanide. If eaten by people, cyanide can affect thyroid hormones and damage nerve cells. Proper processing can minimize cyanide to safe levels of 10ppm, as recommended by the World Health Organization. Cassava can be processed by peeling, fermentation and drying.

2. Potatoes (Solanine poisoning)

Over-stayed potatoes sprout and turn green to progenate. At this time, the plant wants to protect and conserve its food reserves (in the tuber) for the new babies, the shoots. The plant, therefore, produces a toxin, solanine, in large amounts as it sprouts and turns green. Symptoms of solanine poisoning include vomiting, stomach pain, hallucinations and even paralysis. To prevent solanine poisoning, avoid buying and eating over-stayed potatoes, especially those that have already started to look green or have sprouts (shoots).

3. Red Kidney Beans (Phytohemagglutinin poisoning)

Many species of beans contain the toxin Phytohemagglutinin (PHA) as a defense against plant pests and pathogens. However, the concentration levels vary among the species. PHA concentrations are particularly high in red kidney beans. As few as 4 to 5 raw beans, if ingested can cause poisoning with symptoms occurring within 1 to 3 hours after ingestion. The symptoms of PHA poisoning include nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea. Human poisoning of PHA can significantly be reduced by correct cooking: the beans must be boiled for at least 30 minutes at 100 degrees Celcius to denature the PHA protein.

Fair Play: Prenuptial Agreements for Political Alliances for 2025 General Elections in Malawi

Giboh Pearson, a contemporary Malawian musician came to the limelight when he released his hit “Izathera ma penalty”, that can literally be translated that “It will end with penalties”. Here he presumably referred to a sports match such as football that ends in a draw during the regular game time and goes into post-match penalties in order to determine the winner. Ordinarily, the best time to win a match is during the regular game time. Actually, no team whether the weaker one or the stronger one of the two (competitors), would want the match to go into post-match penalties because no one is guaranteed a win. Post-match penalties are kind of painful to the losing side, especially if the loser happens to be the one that was superior during the in-match performance. If it is not post-match penalties, the other and more painful way of breaking the tie is the golden goal where extra time is added and at any time one of the two teams scores the match is ended.

Giboh here is applying an analogy of the post-match penalties to the events that ensue when there is unceremonious breakup of a sweet romantic relationship between two adult people, either in marriage or otherwise. In his lyrics, Giboh is warning his or her romantic partner-to-be that he or she will not just use-and-dump him or her, without facing consequences.

“Awiri sangayende asanapangane”, meaning that two people cannot start off on a journey without a prior agreement ... about where they are going and for what purpose, what mode of transport they will use, what time they will start off and return, who pays for transport, etc. In between the lines, he is talking that a heartbreak is so painful that he or she will not let his or her partner go unpunished should he or she do so.

“Ukazangoti wandisiya, ndizakupondetsa kasipa”, meaning if his or her partner will dare dump him or her, he or she will bewitch him or her. In totality, Giboh is asking beforehand his or her partner-to-be to either commit to the relationship for good or not to start the relationship at all, if he or she will not afford to commit for good.

Talking of romance, the Malawian politics of post-1993 are characterised by short-term romanticism, as such Giboh Pearson’s advice comes handy. But first of all, let me explain what I mean by politics before I encourage politicians to get free advice from this song as we head towards the electioneering season in the runup to the 16th of September 2025 General Elections?

In this brief writeup, I define politics as all activities of cooperation, conflict, and negotiation in decisions about distribution of burdens and benefits among members of a given society. This means that politics is an essential and unavoidable platform in all human societies. As a platform, politics is governed by rules or political institutions that can be broadly classified into; who rules (electoral institutions) – these are rules, procedures and processes that govern how power is earned and distributed, and authorize its use in particular ways; and how he/she rules (accountability institutions) – these are rules, procedures and norms that govern how power and authority is exercised. That is, rules and procedures governing policy decision making process. How well established, popularly accepted and agreed these political institutions are in a particular society, determines the level of political stability of that society.

In Malawi, as is the case in most low-income countries, because of an underdeveloped formal productive economy that would produce more public resources (through taxes, jobs, etc) and allow the for allocation of resources through more formal mechanisms (such as child grants, universal coverage of child grants, old age support, unemployment benefits, etc), clientelist politics takes centre stage. As tax revenues are insufficient for formal redistribution, politicians rely on selective and informal redistribution mechanisms to survive. In this sense, clientelism is in the eyes of politicians, a rational mode of politics, given the need to ensure stability and viability of their (ruling) party.

How have Malawian ruling elites worked with insufficient public resources?

Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi Congress Party (MCP) faced almost non-existent opposition, courtesy of abolition of multiparty politics in early 1970s, that partially insulated his rule from opposition threats. As such, Banda did not need to disburse public resources to private individuals formally or informally to secure stability of his ruling MCP. The Banda’s MCP considered itself secure enough to develop a longer-term vision for the nation and comfortably allocated the required resources for the same. Indeed, Malawi did much better than most countries in the region in terms of public institutions and infrastructural development during the almost 3 decades of Banda’s MCP rule.

At the reintroduction of multiparty electoral politics following the 1993 national referendum, the opposition threat to the ruling parties’ stability kicked in. All post-1993 ruling parties starting with the Bakili Muluzi’s United Democratic Front (UDF), Bingu wa Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Joyce Banda’s People’s Party (PP), Arthur Peter Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and Lazarus Chakwera’s Malawi Congress Party (MCP), faced threat of opposition. As such, in order to survive these parties, have in one way or another, been disbursing public resources to private individuals, mostly informally, to secure stability of their being in power. Courtesy of simple majority electoral rule, these parties enclaved and massively supported a narrow regional area that ensured that, at minimum, an electoral win. Using the simple majority, any electoral region with about 30 percent plus of the voters, can dominate. No wonder the UDF-cum-DPP, courtesy of simple majority electoral rule dominated for almost three decades since change to multiparty electoral politics in 1993. As simple majority tended to weaken opposition threat to their ruling, the dominant parties also tended to grow politically arrogant as they would consider themselves untouchables.

The voter domination being the broader characteristic of the post-1993 ruling parties in Malawi, however, in between them they faced differing levels of opposition threats to their ruling. Due to existing threat of the Kamuzu Banda’s MCP, Bakili Muluzi quickly rounded up key MCP leaders including Kamuzu himself with house arrests to lessen the force of opposition threat. He also focused on privatization of state-owned properties in order to raise funds for redistribution, mostly informally, to individuals including key persons in the opposition parties with a goal of remaining in power. Formal accountability institutions such as the Ombudsman, Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Malawi Human Rights Commission, were put in place, but merely for ticking the boxes with the donors, and not for the service of Malawians. The decade of UDF rule was often referred to as a “lost decade” by the people on the streets.

The political legitimacy of Bakili’s UDF was lowest during his second term, made complex by his failed attempt for open term and third term bid. On his retirement, his anointed successor and UDF candidate for the 2004 General Elections, Bingu wa Mutharika faced a hard time. His marginal win of about 30 percent of the counted votes was a testament to the weak legitimacy for a ruling party. In simple arithmetic terms, this election results indicated that about 70 percent of the population did not approve Bingu as their leader. This was a toll order in terms of opposition threat to his ruling.

His direct condemnation and denouncement of his own party (UDF) right at his inauguration seemed to have rescued him from his imminent collapse from power. Even though the official parliamentary opposition was expected to soar with his ditching of UDF to form a new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the actual situation played out differently. Actually, the political pattern changed: the ruling 30 percent became the minority opposition, and the opposition 70 percent took over as the ruling. This boosted Bingu’s legitimacy with one musician calling him (Bingu) “Mose wa lero” meaning modern day version of the biblical Moses who rescued Israelites from Egypt. Indeed, Bingu easily sailed through to the second term with about 70 percent of the total votes counted at the 2009 General Elections. His sense of relative low opposition threat, coupled with funding from the debt relief of highly indebted poor countries (HIPC funds), enabled him to focus on both short-term but formal disbursements (agricultural subsidies) and longer-term projects such as the Nsanje Inland Port.

Unfortunately, in his second term, he and the successors that came after him, went back to the narrow regionalistic politics full of inform clientelistic disbursements of public resources to individuals. This reversal, brew utter resentments from the Malawians who, in turn, voted out Joyce Banda’s People’s Party (PP) in their debut electoral attempt in 2014 and Arthur People Mutharika’s DPP in its re-election attempt in 2019/2020.

With the Constitutional Court re-defining electoral majority as 50% + 1 vote. The Malawian political landscape has changed. The regional enclaves that anchored the parties in the past have significantly been disempowered. The 50% + 1 vote means that any party looking forward to winning a presidential election needs to embrace coalitions and alliances with parties dominant in other regions.

What free advice does Giboh Pearson give to parties as they gear up for 2025 elections?

Giboh Pearson is giving free advice to the about-to-be couple parties that are about to enter into political coalitions and alliances that for fair play, they should carefully do their prenuptial agreements. Like in romantic relationships, he is warning that those alliances have potential not end up well, may end up in penalties. I want to extend that the dissolution may actually be by a golden goal, where if one partner scores that is the end of the game.

With annual inflation rate rising for the sixth straight month to hit 34.3% in September 2024, is Malawi a hyperinflationary economy?

The annual inflation rate in Malawi rose for the sixth straight month to hit 34.3% in September 2024, up from 33.9% in the prior month of August 2024. Is Malawi’s economy experiencing a hyperinflation?

Inflation is a decrease in the purchasing power of a currency (money), reflected in a general increase in the prices of goods and services in an economy. This is usually measured using a consumer price index (CPI), which measures the overall change in the prices of goods and services that people typically buy over time.

CPI = Total cost of a basket of goods in current period/ Total cost of a basket of goods in base period * 100

The CPI statistics in Malawi is computed by the National Statistical Office of Malawi (NSO) every month. The figure below shows the CPI statistics for Malawi from September 2021 to September 2024.

An extremely rapid inflation is termed a hyperinflation, which is a situation where the prices of all goods and services rise uncontrollably over a defined time period. Generally, inflation is termed hyperinflation when the rate of inflation grows at more than 50% a month. The International Accounting Standards characterizes an economic environment of a country to be hyperinflationary when the cumulative inflation rate over three years approaches, or exceeds, 100%.

Cumulative inflation        = ((CPI in current period / CPI in base period) – (1)) * 100                                 or

                                         = ((CPI in current period - CPI in base period) / CPI in base period) * 100

The computation of cumulative inflation is based on CPI statistics, and in Malawi it is released by the National Statistical Office (NSO) every month. In the graph below, the three-year assessment points are from September 2021 to September 2024.

Based on the statistics released by the NSO, the CPIs for the assessment points are: 91.04 for September 2021, 114.58 for September 2022, 146.39 for September 2023, and 196.62 for September 2024. The cumulative inflation over a three-year period (as of September 2024) was calculated as ((CPI Sept 2024/CPI Sept 2021) - 1) x 100, that is ((196.62/91.04)-1) * 100 = 115.97%.

The cumulative inflation rate over a three-year period, as of September 2024, exceeded the 100 percent mark, that is, it was 115.97 percent as of 30th September 2024. By this indicator alone, Malawi is a hyperinflationary economy.

However, in addition to this quantitative indicator, the International Accounting Standards, also provide a set of four qualitative indicators of a hyperinflationary economy, and these are:

• The general population prefers to keep its wealth in non-monetary assets or in a relatively stable foreign currency. Amounts of local currency held are immediately invested to maintain purchasing power.
• The general population regards monetary amounts not in terms of the local currency but in terms of a relatively stable foreign currency. Prices may be quoted in that currency.
• Sales and purchases on credit take place at prices that compensate for the expected loss of purchasing power during the credit period, even if the period is short.
• Interest rates, wages, and prices are linked to a price index.

Now, considering the five indicators together, is Malawi a hyperinflationary economy?

Don't Devalue Kwacha But Abolish Dual Foreign Exchange Rate System to Address Forex Crisis in Malawi

The current shortage of foreign currency is deepening into a crisis

The Reserve Bank of Malawi has pressed a panic button for an impending foreign exchange (in short, forex) crisis. According to the Financial and Economic Review, at the end of first quarter of 2023, gross official forex reserves were estimated at US$216.7 million which were just enough for 0.9 month’s imports (Reserve Bank of Malawi Financial and Economic Review Volume 57, Issue 1 accessed on RBM website on 02 June, 2023). Some days ago (Thursday 24^th May 2023) the National Oil Company of Malawi, (NOCMA) Limited a government company that is mandated to import and manage strategic reserves of petroleum products (in short fuel) reported to the Parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources and Climate Change that the company owes fuel supplier (Adax) US$14.8 million. Same story was told by Petroleum Importers Limited (PIL), that represents a grouping of private sector fuel importers, who said that they need US$13 million to pay their suppliers. And that since these bills are due for payment, these companies are facing challenges accessing more open credits. Some government operations have, for some time now, been reduced to the minimum or even temporarily suspended due to forex shortage. There are backlogs of unissued passports at Immigration Department, driving licenses at the Road Traffic Directorate, and national ID at the National Registration Bureau, to mention but a few. Contractors of roads and other public infrastructure projects are missing completion dates in part due to their failure to access forex with which to import materials and equipment.

This is not a new phenomenon for Malawi in recent years. According to the Reserve Bank of Malawi, Malawi needs US$3 billion per year (about US$250 million per month) to meet its imports requirements but only generates about US$1 billion in foreign currency (about 33 percent). Key cause of the forex shortage has been reported to be a negative trade balance or a trade deficit, that is, that the value of Malawi’s exports is persistently less than the value of imports.

The fact that forex shortage is endemic rather than a temporary crisis in Malawi, means that the country has the skills and experience to survive this monster. Some of the key economic text book measures that Malawi has been using include: recourse to international grants and borrowing in foreign currency, discouraging unnecessary imports through imposition of taxes on certain commodities, promotion of domestic production of exportable goods and services, devaluation of Malawi Kwacha against major foreign currencies, and use of a dual foreign exchange rate system, among others.

I will now focus on the last two measures, that is, the devaluation and use of the dual foreign currency exchange rate system to argue for the case that the government through RBM should abolish the dual foreign exchange rate system, and not to devalue the Malawi Kwacha, in order to address the current deepening forex crisis in Malawi.

Devaluation of Malawi Kwacha is not a solution

Devaluation is a downward adjustment of a currency value relative to other currencies with aim to balance trade. Devaluing Malawi Kwacha reduces the cost of Malawi's exports and increases the cost of imports, rendering the latter less attractive. The expectation is that exports will increase and imports will decrease, thereby a better balance of payments is expected as the trade deficit shrinks. In May last year (2022), the government through RBM devalued the local currency Malawi Kwacha by 25 percent, in what it termed ‘currency re-alignment’. However, while the unit value (in US$) of Malawi’s exports has reduced, the volume of exports did not increase as much to compensate for the loss in value. On the other hand, the cost of imported goods in Malawi Kwacha has increased tremendously after the devaluation. Indeed, this has been witnessed by consumers who have seen prices of imported goods and services rising each day. In some cases, shop owners have failed to replenish some goods either that they do not have forex for importation or for fear that at new prices, the goods will not sell as fast to make a business sense. Empty shelves or guised re-arrangement of goods display in some high-end supermarkets and closing down of some air ticket sale shops, are telling. In short, the 25 percent devaluation of Malawi Kwacha that was effected in May last year, has failed to stabilize the forex situation in Malawi. As such, another devaluation will just elevate further the cost of public debt service and worsen the already fragile forex situation.

Dual foreign exchange rate system is a silent enemy

Malawi is using a dual exchange rate where foreign currencies are being exchanged in the banks at both fixed official exchange rate currently at US$1 to K1,036 and a floating rate that is currently averaging at US$1 to K1,550. Principally, a dual foreign exchange rate system is adopted as a short-term solution for dealing with an economic crisis, as a way to lessen pressure on foreign reserves that results in capital flight by investors.

Dual foreign exchange rate system is, however, susceptible to manipulation by parties with the most to gain from currency differentials. Forex bureaus and banks that maximise on the spread between the bureau rates (now averaging US$1 to K1,550) and the official exchange rate published by the Reserve Bank of Malawi (of US$1 to K1,036), have been enjoying a mark-up of K514 per US$1 sold, about 50 percent. Other beneficiaries are exporters and importers who deliberately do not properly account for all of their transactions in order to maximize currency gains. There are reports that import bills are inflated by some unscrupulous traders who illegally externalise forex[i]. Equally, there are reports of companies which are quoting lower than actual prices of their exports, and hence proceeds (in US Dollars) remitted back into Malawi might be lower than the actual proceeds[ii]. Chimjeka (2022) stated that Reserve Bank of Malawi acknowledged that at least K500 billion might have been illegally externalised out of Malawi in 2018[iii]. While some companies are pushed into these illegal foreign exchange externalization activities in order to meet their legitimate external financial obligations in the face of forex restrictions via the legal channels, other are purely motivated by profit, and the latter tend to push to keep the dual foreign exchange system in place even when it is not useful or it hurts the wider economy.

Dual exchange rate system drives inflation in Malawi Kwacha prices due to the shifting of transactions to the parallel exchange rate as well as the depreciation of the parallel rate compared to the official fixed rate. Indeed, most private sector business people who import goods into Malawi, are accessing forex at bureau rate even in the banking halls. To remain afloat, they are forced to increase the Malawi Kwacha price of their imported goods. This is attested by the continuing rise of prices of imported goods in supermarkets and other stores, even way after the devaluation of Malawi Kwacha. This is also reflected in the general inflation rate that has been consistently high and rising even with intervention of various monetary policy measures by the Reserve Bank of Malawi.

While the private sector players are willing to buy forex at the bureau rate, as they have the privilege and flexibility to switch to other products, and/or adjust their Malawi Kwacha prices at will, it is not the case for government agencies, whom, as a matter of law, are obligated to supply the goods and services at a fixed access fee regulated by government. The shortage of materials for producing national passports, national IDs and driver’s license may reflect reluctance of commercial banks to sell the forex to these government agencies at the official exchange rate, while preferring to sell the same to the private sector at the bureau rate. Meanwhile, the little forex under the RBM’s official reserves is rationed and mostly preserved for more politically pressing imports such as fuel, fertilizers, medicines, etc.

Like the pure fixed foreign exchange rate system, the dual foreign exchange rate system also triggers black markets as government-mandated restrictions on currency purchases force individuals to pay much higher exchange rates for access to dollars or other foreign currencies. The existence of a dual exchange rate and a currency black market takes most forex transactions out of the purview of the monetary policy authorities, the RBM, and therefore, contributes to the country’s long period of forex instability.

Conclusion

Like many other strategic commodities, forex should not be left in the hands the private sector at will. To avert this forex crisis, the Government of Malawi through the Reserve Bank of Malawi need to temporarily abolish the dual foreign exchange rate system. This action will bring decency in forex market.

This will also make it easier for contractors seeking forex to import equipment and materials to implement government funded projects in mining, agriculture, health, education, energy, etc., as there will not be any preferential sale of forex to the high-priced fast-moving consumer goods sector by the private sector.

Furthermore, tobacco farmers whose prices are quoted in US$ will get a relatively real value for their money because the commercial banks buy them at the official rate rather than at the bureau rate. Currently, there are media reports that some farmers are opting to sell their tobacco leaf to the vendors who in turn smuggle it to Zambia. These farmers claim that they get a price of about K4,500 per kg about US$4.34 per kg. This price is far above what is offered on the Tobacco Auction Floors (average US$2.23 for the first seven weeks this year). By smuggling the Malawi’s number one forex earner, Malawi loses not just the forex but also revenue in taxes.

Similarly, exporters of Malawian merchandise would desist from malpractices of under-reporting or even smuggling, if the hard currency US Dollars that they bring will be sold at the same rate as the official rate in order for them to acquire Malawi Kwacha.

Last but not least, diaspora would be more willing to send money via commercial banks knowing that there is no strong incentive to risk carrying cash to trade at better price in the bureau or black market. All this money would be available in the purview of the Reserve Bank of Malawi to rationalize its usage aligned with national priorities.

 

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[i] https://mwnation.com/k719bn-lost-transfer-pricing-externalisation/

[ii] MRA pursuing K50 billion transfer pricing cases - Business Malawi

[iii] Chimjeka, Rabecca. (2022) “Court convicts couple over K5 billion forex externalisation”, Times Online, 5th March 2022 accessed at https://times.mw/court-convicts-couple[i]over-k5-billion-forex-externalisation/

Development revisited - political and social relations matter

Arturo Escobar’s “The Invention of Development” provides a historical account of the idea of development in contemporary literature to have been created as the solution to the problems of the postcolonial world, for which, he concludes that it failed to achieve the goals it had set for itself (Escobar, 1999: 383). The notion of development resurfaced again in the potwar period, albeit, it being reconfigured and conceived as economic growth. Championed by the World Bank, raging poverty at the time, defined as people who had an annual per capita income of less than $100, and comprised 70% of the world’s population, were attributed to low economic growth. In this regard, the remedy to this problem was, logically, to boost economic growth.

With development defined as economic growth, modernity and its manifestations (industrialization, urbanization, and capital investment) were proposed as the only solutions to the problem of under-development. This discourse was propagated and transplanted through education programme, financial assistance programmes, and all other possible avenues via the national and international institutions and entire systems that were created to fight poverty. According to Escobar (1999:384) in this conception, development represents modernization of the indigenes of the south. In this case, one can think of development as a concept that originated from the ideals of the Enlightenment era that chastised capitalism best way to achieve economic growth. Writing from poststructuralism tradition, Escobar notes that this conception of development revolves around three meta-theories: transforming society towards industrialization, modifying the values of society in favour of possessive individualism, and capitalist development.

While economic growth is important for development, conceptualizing development as economic growth is narrow, simplistic and problematic. It is devoid of people, their political organization and cultures. Yes, development is quintessentially political and potentially conflictual. Indeed, wherever human groups form there emerge some universal and necessary processes which constitute politics. The bloodline of all processes in all human collectives, politics can be summarized as all activities of cooperation, conflict, and negotiation in decisions about distribution of burdens and benefits among members of a given society.

Configured in the broader but neglected realm, development can be defined as a transformative process of change in the structure and use of wealth and power. Using this conceptualization, therefore, two pathways of pro-poor development can be identified: a) when a society changes the way, it distributes burdens and benefits. By societal burdens, I mean the taxes and other obligations that are imposed on citizens by the state; and societal benefits, I mean the public goods and services that are provided by the state to protect its citizens, enhance their welfare, and expand their life opportunities. When a society changes the way, it distributes burdens and benefits, this also triggers changes the relations of power amongst social groups within that society. For example, a land reform programme that redistributes land resources to the landless families can alter the balance of rural wealth and power. b) When a society changes its political and social relations, this also changes the way in which that particular society distributes its societal burdens and benefits. For example, recognizing rights of trades unions or peasant movements, or disenfranchisement of slaves in a particular society – are all expected to some extent to affect the way the societal burdens and benefits are distributed, wishfully, in favour of the majority.

The dominance of the narrow, simplistic and problematic conceptualization of development is telling of its results. Despite massive outlays of humanitarian aid and capital in the form of grants, loans and foreign direct investments from the north to the south, recipient countries are not registering commensurate economic growth, let alone, development. It is perhaps, time to re-look and re-consider development, away from the narrow conceptualizing as economic growth, to the broader conceptualizing that encompasses people, their political and social relations. The dominant concept of development has been reduced to implantation of the western economic and social values represented in modernity - industrialization, urbanization, and capital investment; the destruction of traditional ways of life and infuse them with the (”better”) western values in order to stop them from living precariously, and; in a certain way the demonization of the peasantry (in favour of capital) as an unproductive, surplus, and unprepared workforce, living anachronistic ways of life that they do not fit with modern ideals of prosperity. It can, thus, be postulated that the contemporary dominant notion of development is not a process made to improve people’s lives but a discourse that takes them little into account and generates many more results in the world that creates it, than in the one it tries to change. In short, development is simply doing something at the periphery while not disturbing or promoting economic growth at the centre.

Reference:

Escobar, A. (1999). The Invention of Development. Current History, Vol. 98 no. 631: 382-87.

The Surging COVID 19 Crisis in Malawi is not a Cash Cow

Now that the Acess to Information Act of 2017 (ATI 2017) has been operationalized by the Government of Malawi (GoM), Malawians expect enhanced transparency and accountability in the fight against the COVID 19 pandemic, particularly now that we see a surge in numbers of new cases and deaths.

The ATI 2017 legislation compels duty bearers (both state and non-state) to pro-actively disclose information related to  COVID 19 response. This legislation also empowers Malawian citizens, journalists included, to demand duty bearers, to release information on how resources meant for the COVID 19 prevention and control are being mobilized and utilized. This is the only way to ensure that billions of Kwachas that are being said to be allocated to fight against this pandemic will achieve their intended purpose and do not just end up in people's pockets.

Since the COVID 19 outbreak was declared a state of national disaster in Malawi, following the first reported cases of COVID 19, in April 2020, GoM and many other non-state actors quickly started mobilizing resources for prevention and control of the pandemic. GoM and donors have made substantial, though not adequate, resources available for implentation of the prevention and control measures. With the ATI 2017 now operationalized, it is important that GoM through the newly established National COVID 19 Office in the Office of the President and Cabinet do diligently and promptly take stock and report to the nation what was planned, what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. Re-assess and re-design the national response plan to take into account the new developments (surge in new cases and deaths) and new funding opportunities and partners. The current updates by the Presidential Taskforce that simply focus on reporting new cases and deaths is inadequate. Malawians at large need to know how many ventilators do we now have, against the previously reported massive shortages of the equipment? Also, which donor is providing how much, to whom, and for what purposes are the said funds being or planned to used for? The fortnight reports by the President should include this information in the comprehensive account of what the GoM and all other partners are doing to contain the outbreak.